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Murder; tampering with physical evidence; appeal pursuant to statute (§ 52-265a) involving matter of substantial public interest; claim that trial court improperly denied motion to dismiss charges; whether trial court committed clear error in determining that defendant failed to establish that certain documents seized by police pursuant to search warrant were protected by attorney-client privilege; whether trial court abused its discretion in limiting testimony of defendant's expert witnesses and in precluding testimony of two other expert witnesses; claim that manner in which documents were maintained established that they were privileged; claim that documents were sufficient in and of themselves to be considered privileged because their content was obviously useful to preparing defense; $claim\ that\ documents\ in\ one\ seized\ file\ were\ privileged\ because\ they\ were\ substants$ tively identical to documents in other seized file that parties had stipulated was covered by attorney-client privilege; claim that file containing estate planning documents was subject to attorney-client privilege because documents were created for purpose of seeking legal advice; whether trial court abused its discretion

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and to present a defense when it precluded him from cross-examining individual	
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